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T E N
From Present African Health Care 
Systems to the Future  
Health Financing in Ghana and Rwanda
samuel adu-gyamfi
I N T R O D U C T I O N
ThaT There is a posiTive correlation between healthy populations 
and socio-economic and human development is not in dispute. It is 
in countries’ interests, therefore, to aim to have healthy, productive 
citizens. A strong, well-functioning public health care system would go 
some way to realising this. In sub-Saharan Africa, the issue of how to 
finance health care and make it accessible to the majority of citizens is an 
ongoing challenge.
While the overall intention behind The Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s was to assist development, 
the inadvertent result in many African countries that subscribed to SAPs 
was, in fact, the deepening of poverty and inequality. The aims of the 
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, later, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) are to reduce poverty and poverty-related 
diseases, increase gender equality, reduce maternal and child mortality, 
to address climate change and environmental degradation, and to further 
ensure prosperity, peace, and justice (UN, 2018). 
One of the consequences of the adoption of SAPs was that 
governments reduced their spending on health care. In some instances 
(Zimbabwe, for example) the gains countries had made after independence 
were eroded. The targets the MDGs and the SDGs set in place created 
– and continue to create – the possibility for pursuing actions aimed 
at sustaining the health systems of these countries, despite the rising 
maternal and infant morbidity and mortality rates and child deaths (UN, 
2018). Significantly, goal three of the SDGs aims, among other things, 
at focusing on providing more efficient funding of health systems, 
improved sanitation and hygiene, increased access to physicians, and 
more tips on ways to reduce ambient pollution (UN, 2018). Globally, 
this is directed at making strong progress to save the lives of millions.
Some African governments have attempted to bridge the gap between 
the rich and the poor with regard to access to health services through 
the introduction of different forms of public health insurance – Ghana 
(2003), Nigeria (2005), and Rwanda (1999) are examples. Using Ghana 
and Rwanda as case studies, this chapter traces the post-independence 
precursors to public health insurance and the impact of socio-economic 
and political factors on the development of health insurance schemes. 
The rationale for the selection of Ghana and Rwanda as case studies 
is that these two countries introduced a form of health insurance that 
sought to bridge the inequities within the social and economic spaces of 
their respective countries and to further render effective support in the 
area of tackling diseases, whether communicable or non-communicable. 
Organically, Ghana and Rwanda are middle-income and low- and 
middle-income African countries (World Bank in Ghana, 2018). They 
epitomise the general social and economic trajectories within the 
African environment. Similar socio-economic issues, alongside similar 
communicable and non-communicable health challenges, were the 
impetus for Ghana and Rwanda’s governments to put systems in place, 
especially relating to health financing, to allow for public action in 
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accessing health care and participating in the prevention, control, and 
management of diseases.
In pursuing this research, the theory of lesson-drawing has been 
found useful. Rose (1991) argues that ‘(l)esson-drawing addresses 
the question: under what circumstances and to what extent can a 
programme that is effective in one place transfer to another?’ In a study 
describing health insurance practices, as this one does, using the separate 
examples of Ghana and Rwanda, lessons to be drawn can be examined 
and, if appropriate, tested elsewhere. If striving to shape present and 
future discourses and policy-related issues of health care in Africa, and 
specifically in sub-Saharan Africa, is the intention, these two case studies 
are good starting points. Thus, this study envisages that interested 
activists and policy-makers will draw lessons from these two countries, 
contingent upon prevailing circumstances in their own countries.
Methodologically, this qualitative contribution synthesises thoughts 
and draws lessons from multiple secondary sources covering health 
care financing in Ghana and Rwanda. In the main, these were pertinent 
journal articles, books on the subject, and specialist reports. I selected the 
sources based on their authenticity and relevance to the study. Sources 
have been corroborated and triangulated to deal with the challenges 
associated on occasion with single source arguments. In presenting a 
thematic analysis, the research deals with the issue of continuity and 
change within the respective two countries’ strategies for health care 
financing aimed at ensuring universal health coverage. 
The chapter is presented in five sections. The first section discusses 
the evolution of health care management in Africa. In the second, 
attention is paid to the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
and their impact on health care in sub-Saharan Africa. The third and 
fourth sections discuss the case studies of the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) in Ghana and the community-based health insurance 
scheme (CBHI) in Rwanda. These two sections examine the origins, 
implementation and financing, socio-economic impact, and challenges 
facing the scheme. The final section provides a comparative narrative of 
the case studies, suggests lesson-learning, and offers recommendations.
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T H E  E V O L U T I O N  O F  H E A LT H  C A R E  M A N A G E M E N T 
I N  A F R I C A
Health institutions serve as a useful foundation in the social, political, 
and economic development of every society. The positive correlation that 
exists between health and development underscores why health insti-
tutions in terms of importance are on a par with other central institutions 
of governance (Akortsu & Abor, 2011). The age-old association of disease 
with impediments to realising one’s full human capabilities caused Africa’s 
governments to search for ways to combat disease and encourage the 
health of citizens (Brenya & Adu-Gyamfi, 2014).
In the pre-colonial era, health care was managed by traditional 
authorities who entrusted the health of their subjects to traditional 
practitioners (Maier, 1979). Since payments were made in kind or 
through livestock, it was essentially an out-of-pocket payment 
system. Indigenous practitioners received respect and dignity from 
their patients; and this system of reward replaced the need to provide 
a monetary value for their services (Kale, 1995; Akortsu & Abor, 2011; 
Igoli et al., 2005; Yankuzo, 2014). 
During colonisation, the management of health was transferred 
gradually to the colonial government through the introduction of a 
different cosmology about what caused disease and ill health – the germ 
theory. The expansion of biomedicine and Western ideas of disease 
causation went hand in hand with the entrenchment of colonial rule. 
Initially, biomedicine was used to treat the ailments affecting imperial 
settlers and colonialists. However, during the period of the 1920s 
to the 1960s, a time when native labour was critical to building the 
colonies, biomedicine became deeply rooted in treating epidemics and 
keeping native populations relatively healthy (Lock & Nguyen, 2010). 
Health care during this period was funded from both the taxation 
of indigenous populations and through colonial grants. Though the 
mode of funding was largely through cost sharing, Africans were 
marginalised in the colonial health system. They were often suspicious 
of biomedical doctors; many preferred to use traditional or indigenous 
medicine (Addae, 1997; Tilley, 2016).
During the period of independence (1960s–1980s), biomedicine 
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and health care became an emblem for modernity and nation building. 
African governments saw health as an essential requirement for 
economic, social, and political development. In the post-independence 
era they placed the issue of cost at the centre of their efforts to bridge 
the health accessibility gap between the poor and the rich. Most post-
independence African governments adopted a user fee-free mode of 
health care delivery in order to ensure that cost would not deter any 
individual from seeking health care. Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention 
People’s Party (CPP) in Ghana, Julius Nyerere’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM) in Tanzania, and Seretse Khama’s Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) in Botswana are examples of governing parties that adopted the 
user fee-free model of health financing (Brenya & Adu-Gyamfi, 2014; 
Gros, 2015).
To ensure that these policies were effectively implemented, post-
independence governments developed health infrastructure and 
training of personnel for the health industry. These developments were 
possible at the time because of favourable economic variables, which 
offered the potential for Africa’s economy to prosper. Some of the 
fundamentals that supported development were derived from nature’s 
beneficence, such as oil, for example. Favourable oil prices, the high 
prices of export primary commodities, and sound colonial reserves, 
among other things, offered the promise of development and growth. 
Although it unfolded gradually, user fee-free health care thrived 
in the immediate post-independence years and considerably larger 
numbers of people from impoverished communities had access to 
health care. These developments were short-lived, however (Ewusi, 
1989; Castro-Leal et al., 1999; Saul & Leys, 1999; Barnes et al., 2015; 
Gros, 2015).
A series of coups between the late 1960s and 1980s, high inflation 
rates, a decline in primary commodity-based foreign exchange 
earnings, and corruption (Gros, 2015; Akortsu & Abor, 2011) all 
contributed to halting or reversing progress. The situation led to the 
introduction of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the debt burden on African 
countries that came with it. The impact was felt most profoundly on 
the health sectors of these African countries. Indebted governments, 
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in exchange for loans to pay foreign creditors, were forced to strip 
their health systems of various subsidies, leading to the disparity in 
health services in sub-Saharan Africa. Through the SAPs, the user fee 
model was introduced in Africa and the gap between the poor and the 
rich began to widen. Although the user fee model had been introduced 
to encourage sustainability, efficiency, and effectiveness in the health 
services, its aim was lost as governments and health administrators saw 
user fees as a means of raising funds for day-to-day administration. In 
no time health care in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa had reverted 
to the colonial standard where one had to pay to access health care, 
thus reinforcing disparities and inequities. The difference in this 
period, however, was that the disparity was between poor and affluent 
Africans, rather than between colonisers and indigenous populations 
(Loewenson, 1993; Gilson, 1997).
Championed by the World Health Organization, universal health 
coverage in Africa was a priority of the 2015 Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) agenda (Odeyemi & Nixon, 2013). The recent wave of 
democratisation of most countries in Africa has correlated positively 
with the development of their public health institutions (Carbone, 
2011; Gros, 2015). Nevertheless, the recent adoption of universal 
health coverage and other re-emerging forms of social insurance by 
many governments in sub-Saharan Africa has once again raised the 
issue of the relationship between cost and access to health care. While 
there are other factors to take into account, the issue of cost remains 
a critical obstacle to universal health coverage, (Boateng et al., 2017).
H E A LT H  C A R E  F I N A N C I N G  A N D  T H E  S T R U C T U R A L 
A D J U S T M E N T  P R O G R A M M E S  ( S A P S )  I N  S U B -
S A H A R A N  A F R I C A
In order to rescue African economies from their precarious state, caused 
by high inflation, high incidence of corruption, and low gross domestic 
product (GDP), Western policy-makers, the World Bank and the IMF, 
to name a few stakeholders, responded with a series of  interventions 
under the SAP banner – Structural Adjustment Policies and Structural 
Adjustment Loans being two examples. SAPs were presented as short-
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term austerities that would lead to long-term growth and development 
(Peabody, 1996: 823). These solutions, which translated to cuts in 
health expenditure, have raised controversial arguments concerning 
Africa’s socio-economic and human development. The common 
explanation given for cuts in expenditure was the decline in export 
commodities, which had initially financed most government revenues 
in post-independence Africa. The drugs and technology responsible 
for health care in most sub-Saharan states were imported and this fact, 
coupled with devaluing currencies, led to an inevitable rise in the cost 
of health care (Peabody, 1996).
The negative impacts of SAPs on the health sector of multiple African 
governments, a sector critical to a country’s overall development, has 
been documented clearly. These have included cuts in public health 
expenses by participating governments, adverse effects on the public 
health workforce, reduced health accessibility and coverage for the 
population, conflict of interest between public health institutions and 
private health entities, and the decentralisation and increasing cost of 
health care (Kentikelenis, 2017). Concerning the cuts in public health 
expenditure, many governments had to reduce the subsidies that 
cushioned the cost of health care for the poor and vulnerable, and 
so they made paying a user fee compulsory for accessing health care 
(Stromquist, 1999). Essentially, it was the introduction of SAPs that 
raised the cost of health care in most African states.
The SAPs also affected the health sector indirectly through the 
macroeconomic policies African governments adopted. The changes in 
policy resulted in the income of individuals going down and the prices 
of goods and services going up. Included in this increase were the price 
of drugs and hospital services. This, in turn, had an effect on household 
incomes and savings, which resulted in low use of health services. In 
addition, the inability of public health centres to provide essential 
medical technologies to combat infirmities led to many individuals 
turning to private health institutions (Peabody, 1996). This situation 
placed rural dwellers at a further disadvantage because they could not 
afford  the health care provided by these private entities. Public health 
institutions in rural centres were generally understaffed, and shortages 
of essential medications were common (Buor, 2004).
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Ineffective tax collection coupled with stripping off tariffs and import 
duties in the name of increasing foreign direct investment saw a drastic 
drop in public revenue in those African states that had enrolled in the 
SAPs (Woodward, 1992). Governments could not fund health financing 
exemption programmes. The SAPs also led to workers being laid off so 
their ability to pay out-of-pocket for health care was reduced.
Although the SAPs had been directed toward extricating the 
economies of African countries from dire macroeconomic difficulties, 
these programmes in most instances resulted in increasing disparity 
and inequities.
Presenting an opposing view, one which sees the SAPs as having had 
some positive effect, Clements et al. (2013) argue that the SAPs increased 
social spending, which encouraged sustainability of the health systems 
in Africa. Similarly, Peabody (1996) contends that reducing government 
subsidies for health care made individuals work and pay for their own 
health, which increased the sustainability of Africa’s health services. In 
contrast, Schatz (1994) states that the performances of African economies 
during the SAPs and after the programme became worse since indicators 
such as GDP and poverty status, among others, were either the same or 
increased slowly in this period. 
In recent times African governments continue to consider the issue 
of health financing as an essential determinant of universal access to 
health care. Most countries have adopted national health coverage 
and other forms of social funding to health care in order to increase 
universal access. In the next two sections, the discussion focuses on 
two examples: the health insurance programmes in Ghana and Rwanda.
H E A LT H  C A R E  M A N A G E M E N T  I N  G H A N A
Over time, the NHIS has become an essential tool in Ghana’s system 
of health management and financing. The Ghanaian idea of access to 
national health care, as embodied in the NHIS, provides a legitimate, 
continuously evolving tool for free access to health care. It needs 
refinement, nevertheless, to ensure that the poor will be enrolled in 
ways that guarantee their protection.
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Origins of the NHIS
Ghana is one of the few countries in Africa to have successfully 
implemented a form of social insurance health care, known locally 
as the National Health Insurance Scheme (Sarpong et al., 2010). 
Ghana’s success rate stems from the zealous efforts made by previous 
governments to pursue universal health care for poor and vulnerable 
groups (see Adu-Gyamfi et al., 2015a). Political actors from Kwame 
Nkrumah, Kofi Busia, to John Kufuor all pushed for some form of 
health care financing based on the belief that health care implementation 
and financing is an essential tool for social and economic development.
After independence, Nkrumah, the founder of the CPP and 
Ghana’s first president, gave the citizens hope of universal access to 
health care for all. However, mismanagement and corruption, which 
was especially rife in health centres and hospitals, thwarted the dream. 
In 1966 a military coup saw the National Liberation Council (NLC) 
seize power. This further complicated the provision of health care. 
By then Ghanaians had come to relish the idea of the free health care 
introduced by Nkrumah. Subsequently, when Busia’s Progress Party, 
which replaced the CPP as the next civilian government in 1969, 
tried to introduce a nominal fee as guarantee for access to health care, 
there was widespread resistance. The idea that finance was a barrier 
to accessing health care prompted Busia to adopt a health insurance 
scheme of financing health care where the government paid a greater 
portion of the costs (Brenya & Adu-Gyamfi, 2014). 
The type of health care management introduced by Nkrumah and 
Busia was put to the test during the 1970s and 1980s. Amidst a drastic 
decline in the health status of Ghanaians, and a high incidence of 
corruption and mismanagement at the national level, the introduction of a 
user fee as a compulsory tool to access health care widened the inequality 
gap, especially between the rural and urban centres (Ewusi, 1989). 
A return to democratisation in 1992, as well as the fourth republi-
can constitution, put the Ghanaian health system on a better path to 
ensuring universal health care to citizens (Carbone, 2011). Ghanaians’ 
hope for better health care management resulted in the New Patriotic 
Party (NPP), led by Kufuor, promising to replace the ‘dreadful cash 
and carry system’ which had existed from 1970–2003 (Carbone, 2011; 
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Gros, 2015). It was during Kufuor’s leadership that the National Health 
Insurance Scheme was introduced in October 2003 through an act of 
parliament. Efforts to establish universal health insurance date back to 
the 1970s when the Hospital Fee (Act 387 of 1971) was established. This 
step was later thwarted by the 1972 coup (Adu-Gyamfi et al., 2015b). 
Some viewed the NHIS as a privilege, while political parties used it 
as political leverage (Carbone, 2011). The NHIS in Ghana is not a neu-
tral entity but one that remains mired in politics. Besides the politics 
and political usefulness of a scheme like the NHIS, there is the need 
to understand the continuities and discontinuities – the changes – that 
gave birth to it. Towards this end it is important to consider the nature 
of the implementation and financing strategies. 
Implementation and financing of NHIS
The first efforts to reintroduce the National Health Insurance Scheme 
were in 1997 under the auspices of the Ministry of Health (MoH), the 
Ghana Health Company, and the Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (SSNIT). These stakeholders intended to mobilise funds to ensure 
a smooth implementation of health insurance. The Ghana Health 
Company, for example, was to provide other means of finance to fund 
health insurance in Ghana (Adoma-Yeboah, 2005). Although they were 
not wholly successful, the existence of private insurance companies, such 
as the Vanguard Assurance Company and the Gemini Life Insurance 
Company in urban centres, enabled alternative funding for health 
insurance (Adu-Gyamfi et al., 2015b). While the rural areas were at a 
disadvantage in terms of insurance companies, in places like Damango, 
Tano, Jaman, and the Dangme West districts support was also provided 
by NGOs and religious bodies, thus showing that a health insurance 
which incorporated the rural populace was possible. 
Today the NHIS is managed by the National Health Insurance 
Authority, which is an autonomous body (NHIS, 2017). It is regulated 
through the National Health Insurance Council, which sees to a number 
of functions: planning, monitoring, and evaluation; registration and 
licensing; administration and management support; and funding and 
investment. Some of the functions the NHIS performs are: registering 
of members for the scheme, ensuring equity in health care coverage, 
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protection of the poor against financial risk, and the drafting of proposals 
to the Minister of Health for the formulation of policies concerning 
health insurance.  
The means of financing the scheme is through a cost-sharing 
responsibility between the participants of the scheme and the 
government of Ghana. Schedules made for this funding are a 2.5 per 
cent National Health Insurance levy on all goods and services collected 
under the Value Added Tax (VAT), 2.5 per cent of 17.5 per cent Social 
Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) contributions per 
month, returns on National Health Insurance Fund investments, and 
premiums paid by those who work in the informal sector (MoH, 2004). 
There are two main groups that use the scheme and they are 
differentiated by whether they work in the formal or informal sector. 
Those who work in the formal sector include employees of private 
entities and self-employed individuals who contribute to the SSNIT 
fund. Children under 18, persons in need of antenatal, delivery, and 
postnatal care, persons classified by the Ministry for Social Welfare as 
indigent under the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 
programme, persons with mental disorders, pensioners of SSNIT, and 
persons aged 70 years and above are entitled to the benefits those in 
formal sector employment receive (NHIS, 2014). 
SSNIT contributors, SSNIT pensioners, adults of age 70 and above, 
and children under 18 years old pay both renewal and card processing 
fees. However, pregnant women, programme beneficiaries, and persons 
with mental disorders are exempted from the card processing fee and 
renewal fees (NHIA, 2017b; 2017c). These formal groups constitute 
about 69 per cent of the NHIS membership composition (Wang et al., 
2017: 19) and they are not required to pay the premium. The second 
group that uses the scheme are those in informal employment: 31 per 
cent of the 40 per cent of the national population covered by NIHS 
are from the informal sector (Wang et al., 2017: 17). Members who are 
informal sector workers are required to pay a premium.
The NHIS covers about 95 per cent of ailments treated in health 
facilities in Ghana (Wang et al., 2017). These are enshrined in the products 
rendered by the hospitals and health facilities. They are the Out-Patient 
Department (OPD) services addressing medical conditions like malaria, 
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acute respiratory tract infection, skin diseases and ulcers, among other 
diseases. The In-Patient Department (IPD) delivers services such as 
laboratory investigations, cervical and breast cancer treatment, as well as 
surgical operations, including appendectomy. The oral and eye services 
deal with issues of dentistry and optometry respectively, while maternal 
service deals with antenatal and postnatal care, including child delivery 
(NHIA, 2014: 10).  
The accredited centres of health care covered by the scheme (Table 1) 
are: community-based health planning and services (CHPS) health centres; 
clinics; polyclinics; primary hospitals, including district hospitals and 
private primary hospitals; and secondary hospitals, which include regional 
hospitals, pharmacies, licensed chemical shops, and diagnostic centres. In 
Ghana, there are about 3,500 public, private, and faith-based health care 
facilities. Of these, 57 per cent are public facilities, 33 per cent are private, 
and 7 per cent are facilities operated by the Christian Health Association of 
Ghana (CHAG) (Wang et al., 2017: 11). Table 1 shows the details of public, 
private, and missionary hospitals. In all, one teaching hospital is private, 
and the rest, which include teaching, municipal, metropolitan, regional, and 
district hospitals, are public facilities.  
Table 1: The number of health service types in Ghana
Facility Type Numbers 
CHPS 653
Clinic 1,173
Health centre 787
Maternity home 369
Polyclinic 16
Hospital unidentified 276
Metropolitan/Municipal hospital 5
Regional hospital 3
Psychiatric hospital 3
Teaching hospital 3
Others 183
Source: Wang et al. 2017: 11
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There exist two main types of health insurance under the NHIS in 
Ghana. These are the social-type health insurance and the private 
commercial health insurance. The social-type health insurance 
is categorised into the District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme 
(DMHIS) and the Private Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (PMHIS). 
The DMHIS is an initiative of the government to target the poor 
who cannot access health care financially. Hence, packages vary 
according to finance status in the community. They are the core poor, 
very poor, poor, middle income, rich, and the very rich (Jehu-Appiah 
et al., 2011). In 2004, the government released 40.6 billion Ghana cedis 
to establish the DMHIS in all districts, metropolitan and municipal 
assemblies (Ghana News Agency, 2004). The DMHIS is self funded, 
with subsidies from the government (MoH, 2004: 11). Returns from 
investments or surplus cash are returned to the scheme. 
The PMHIS operates on market principles. Premiums are determined 
based on a calculated risk of the group being insured getting sick. The 
PMHIS does not receive any funding from the government (MoH, 
2004). Recently, 11 private insurance companies joined the NHIS (see 
Table 2). Because of their incentive to make profit, these companies are 
all based in urban areas. Rural areas are left to rely on DMHIS.
Table 2: Private insurance companies on the NHIS 
Insurance Company Location
Accra Health Insurance Limited Accra
Apex Health Insurance Limited Accra
Cosmopolitan Health Insurance Limited Accra
Empire Health Insurance Accra
Glico Health Limited Accra
Kaiser Global Health Limited Kumasi
Liberty Medical Health Limited Tema
Metropolitan Nationwide Medical Insurance Scheme Accra
NMH Nationwide Medical Insurance Scheme Accra
Premier Health Insurance Company Limited Accra
Universal Health Insurance Limited Tema
Source: http://nhis.gov.gh/phis.asp, accessed 25 October 2017 
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Socio-economic impact of NHIS
The National Health Insurance Scheme has either impacted on or has 
been impacted by several factors associated with social, political, cultural, 
and economic spaces within which the NHIS is implemented in Ghana. 
In addition, global-orientated programmes, like those around the 
MDGs, have also had an impact on how the insurance scheme operates.
The enrolment base of the NHIS is highest among informal workers. 
In Ghana, 80 per cent of people who are employed work in the informal 
economy (Osei-Boateng & Ampratwum, 2011). These informal workers 
are largely grouped into two: the rural sector and the urban informal 
sector (Adu-Amankwah, 1999). Informal workers have to register for the 
NHIS, but when there is proof that they are indigent, they are exempted 
from the payments. However, the nature of informal work places workers 
at a higher risk of exposure to danger and disease, making them the ones 
most likely to need health care services (Gyasi et al., 2017b). To this end, 
most of them consider the NHIS as the safest way to assure their access to 
health care. This indirectly expands the enrolment base of the scheme and 
has the potential to bridge the inequity gap, since most informal workers 
– for instance, the young boys and girls, including women, who work as 
head porters (kayayo) on the streets of major cities like Accra, Kumasi, 
Tema, and Takoradi, farmers, market women, hawkers, labourers – are 
included in this category (Gyasi et al., 2017b). The NHIS has resulted in 
increased hospital attendance in Ghana and has increased the propensity 
for good health as well as an active labour force.
The idea of accessing health care at a subsidised cost has also had an 
impact on the number of subscribers as well as health facility utilisation 
(Dzakpasu et al., 2012). The NHIS has helped to remove lack of finances 
as an obstacle to seeking health care. In other words, it has brought 
health care to the doorstep of the poor (Gyasi et al., 2015). 
Public education offered by the NHIS in collaboration with other 
statutory bodies like the National Commission for Civic Education 
(NCCE) has also increased the utilisation of and enrolment in the 
scheme. In 2008, NHIS coverage was 12.5 million (55 per cent). However, 
this increased by 7 per cent to 14.5 million a year later (NHIA, 2009). 
The chairman of the NHIS Council attributed this increase to the effort 
of the public education department of the National Health Insurance 
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Authority, which had sensitised the various Ghanaian communities 
about the benefits of enrolling in the scheme. The role played by 
public universities in the enrolment and utilisation of NHIS cannot be 
underestimated. Since 2009, the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science 
and Technology (KNUST), for instance, ensured that students who 
were not on the NHIS enrolled upon admission (see Osei et al., 2017). 
The NHIS has been influenced by the politics of the day. Since its 
inception in 2003, Kufuor’s government saw to it that subscribers had 
access to the health centres in their districts, municipal or metropolis 
(NHIA, 2008). This type of care provided by the NHIS was ubiquitous 
from 2004 to 2010. However, the 2008 general elections ushered the John 
Atta Mills-led National Democratic Congress (NDC) into office. The 
policy direction was to initiate a one-time premium contribution. This 
policy, which was to materialise in 2011, was put on hold. This factor 
notwithstanding, the existing NHIS eliminated the regional boundaries 
imposed on health care while emphasising the annual renewal of the 
insurance package. These policy interventions allowed for accessibility 
and equity in health care without prejudice to age, status, ethnicity, and 
geographical location. 
The Millennium Development Goals to some extent have also 
impacted the NHIS in Ghana. The health component of the UN 
programme sought to promote maternal health, combat diseases like 
malaria and HIV/AIDS, and reduce child mortality by 2015. These 
three components have been incorporated into the scheme’s packages, 
starting with the free maternal care adopted in 2008, which also included 
free postnatal care (NHIA, 2008). Even though there has not been much 
progress made at reducing maternal mortality, child mortality rates have 
been positively impacted. The infant mortality rate decreased from a 
previous high of 76 to 52 per 1,000 live births in 2011; there has also been 
significant improvement in terms of the health of women and children 
(Owoo & Lambon-Quayefio, 2013: 19). It can be inferred that mothers 
who had hitherto been unable to access health care due to out-of-pocket 
cost (and who had also formed the habit of not reporting their own ill-
health and that of their children to doctors) have been spurred on to visit 
hospitals with their children due to the social change instigated by the 
National Health Insurance Policy. Again, it is important to emphasise that 
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this policy has served a useful purpose in the lives of individuals, especially 
the poor and those living in deplorable conditions (like the migrant female 
head porters – kayayo – from the Northern and Upper regions of Ghana) 
by giving them the opportunity to access health care (Boateng et al., 2017) 
to seek largely curative care. Sometimes, through such access, some degree 
of counselling is offered, which has the tendency to prevent or stall the 
spread of contagions and also support the treatment of non-communicable 
diseases among the deprived population. 
Challenges of the NHIS in Ghana
The dominant challenge for Ghana’s NHIS is claims management (Adu-
Gyamfi et al., 2015a: 54). The NHIS has gone through changes in the 
type of financing adopted by the National Health Insurance Authority 
over successive years. The claim system was the main way the NHIS 
worked. In this system, the costs of the health care of NHIS subscribers 
were presented to the district, municipal, or metropolitan assemblies 
for a refund. These costs were linked to the individual NHIS numbers, 
which were then forwarded to the Ministry of Finance for a refund 
(NHIS, 2017). 
Claims payments to providers were often delayed for a long time, 
thereby denying subscribers essential services, such as drug supply and 
medical care. In addition, inconsistent billing systems by providers, 
lack of effective mechanisms for tracking claims, and the low billing the 
scheme had introduced undermined the idea of equity in the Ghanaian 
health system (Adu-Gyamfi et al., 2015a). 
Given the complexities attached with claiming a refund, capitation 
was introduced as an alternative means of funding the NHIS. Capitation 
is structured on a ‘per member per month’ basis, where the cost of health 
care of an individual is paid by the NHIS monthly (NHIA, 2017a). 
It was launched in 2011 to reimburse primary care for OPD services. 
Capitation offers the subscriber the opportunity to choose a health 
facility from which they will seek medical service. Recent evaluation 
research has found capitation suitable to be considered ‘a key provider 
payment method for primary out-patient care in order to control cost in 
health care delivery’ provided that some aspects of design be reviewed 
(Andoh-Adjei  et al., 2018).
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The NHIA also complained of late submission of claims by service 
providers. This created a ripple effect of district, municipal, or metropolitan 
assemblies not vetting these claims properly or delaying payments 
(NHIA, 2010). The initial effort to release funds to settle debts in which 
the NHIS owed and which had been processed in 2015 only materialised 
when the government released 180 million Ghana cedis on 5 February 
2017 to settle debts to service providers (Graphic Online, 2017). Initially, 
to combat such payment challenges, and to limit fraud, the NHIA made 
some efforts to introduce an E-Claim system (NHIA, 2013).  
Financial sustainability of the scheme is another challenge (Adu-
Gyamfi & Dramani, 2017). The increase in the scheme’s coverage and 
health facility utilisation does not correlate with the funding source of 
the scheme. Subscribers increased from 23,238 in 2005 to 25,794 in 2006 
(NHIA, 2009). Membership increased by 56 per cent in 2008 and 62 per 
cent in 2009, representing 12.5 and 14.5 million subscribers respectively 
over the two years. Membership increased continuously from 8 million 
subscribers in 2010, to 8.2 million in 2011, 8.8 in 2012, and 10.2 in 
2013 (NHIA, 2013). As at 2013, 38 per cent of the total population 
had enrolled in the scheme (NHIA, 2013). These increasing subscriber 
figures denote an additional means of financing to the scheme. Although 
the government of Ghana had introduced the capitation in 2012 to 
ease the financial burden, ineffective piloting and planning caused its 
suspension in the Ashanti Region (Graphic Online, 2017), along with 
a plan to abolish it (Ampratwum-Mensah, 2017). In order to sustain 
the scheme financially, parliament on 14 July 2017 approved 2.2 billion 
Ghana cedis to aid in the scheme’s debts payment (NHIA, 2017b).
The problem of identifying the poor in the informal sector is also a 
challenge. The general motive of the NHIS is to make the poor exempt 
from paying for health care, or at least make it affordable to them. 
The reality is that it is the larger sections of the population, exactly 
the poor the NHIS is wanting to assist, who are not covered (NHIA, 
2010). Identifying the poor presents a major challenge in the scheme’s 
dream to ensure equity in health care. In order to address this better, 
collaborative efforts have been made by the National Health Insurance 
Authority with organisations like LEAP to identify and enrol poor 
people at community level. 
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There is a tendency among some members of the scheme to abuse it 
by their over-utilisation of health centres (Adu-Gyamfi et al., 2015b). 
Subscribers report to health facilities even if their conditions do not 
demand the service of that type of facility. In other words, the chain 
of medical treatment, which should begin at a primary health centre, 
followed by a secondary and tertiary form of health care based on rec-
ommendations of respective health officials, is not being used (Gobah 
& Zhang, 2011: 90). Furthermore, some subscribers do not complete 
treatment at one health centre. This leads to a duplication of cost, which 
burdens the scheme financially (Adu-Gyamfi et al., 2015a). This moving 
from one centre of care to another might be attributed, in part, to how 
the subscriber was treated by health officials in their previous centre. 
To combat this, the NHIA established a clinical audit unit in 2012 to 
investigate how NHIS subscribers were being treated (NHIA, 2012). 
Two other obstacles to the scheme achieving its objectives concern 
identification (ID) cards and Information Communication Technology 
(ICT). Issues relating to the ID cards include the delay in obtaining the 
card resulting from the management chain of data entry, data batching, 
card production, and distribution (NHIA, 2012). Members compound 
these issues further by changing residence, double registering, or failing 
to identify their location properly. The main problem of the ICT 
department is network jamming; this has a ripple effect on data entry, 
data batching, and checking subscriber eligibility at health centres.  
These challenges negatively affect subscribers’ perception of the 
quality of the health care the scheme is providing – they regard it as poor 
(Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011) – which has led to members changing their 
preference to out-of-pocket health care payment since it is perceived to 
be of a higher quality (Adu-Gyamfi et al., 2015a: 57). This puts the poor 
at a disadvantage as they are unable to afford this (NHIA, 2012); there 
have been occasions when subscribers have had to purchase medication 
that was supposed to be covered by the scheme. There are equally 
related questions concerning policy holders’ perceptions and factors 
influencing renewal in different regions. This has been of particular 
concern in the Volta Region (Boateng & Awunyor-Vitor, 2013: 1–10).
A final challenge linked to the quality of health care is the issue 
of neonatal and maternal mortality. Neonatal mortality accounts for 
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about 40 per cent of child death in Ghana, despite the introduction of 
free maternal health care in 2008. The NHIS does not cover all the cost 
of neonatal treatment, leading some parents to rely on out-of-pocket 
payment. In 2013, for instance, there were several media reports on 
the failing free maternal policy. As at 2016, pregnant women were 
compelled to buy antibiotics, blood tonics, disinfectants, and sanitary 
pads in preparation for delivery (Lambon-Quayefio & Owoo, 2017:2; 
Ghana News Agency, 2016). 
T H E  RWA N D A N  H E A LT H  I N S U R A N C E  S Y S T E M
Rwanda’s system of community-based health insurance (CBHI) 
is sometimes described as unprecedented in the history of CBHIs 
in sub-Saharan Africa. It is further argued that it provides strong 
administrative and political support for the expansion and functioning 
of a health care system. Some countries therefore regard the Rwandan 
model as an alternative vehicle for health sector financing and delivery 
of basic health services (Shimeles, 2010).
Origins of CBHI
This section investigates the origins of Rwanda’s health insurance 
system and the nature of its financing and implementation. It highlights 
some of the benefits as well as the challenges that were confronted 
through the implementation process.
Rwanda was one of the poorly performing economies of Africa, 
and the country relied heavily on foreign exchange earned from tea, 
banana, and coffee exportation (Abbott & Binagwaho, 2017: 103). In 
the 1990s Rwanda experienced unparalleled violence which took an 
exacting toll on the country (Gros, 2015: 223), culminating, in 1994, in 
the 100-day genocide. About 1 million people were killed and many 
more were displaced (Lemarchand, 2004). The genocide did not only 
affect the political, economic, and social institutions of the state. It also 
affected the health system (Binagwaho et al., 2014). During that time, 
Rwanda had the lowest life expectancy and highest infant mortality 
rates. Its health system was in shambles and many health workers 
had fled the country, fearing for their lives. A decade later, by 2005, 
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Rwanda remained one of Africa’s ill-performing economies with GDP 
under USD 300 (Diop & Butera, 2005). 
After the genocide, a development plan called Vision 2020 was 
formulated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by President Paul 
Kagame. The overall aim was to reduce poverty and the plan included 
implementing universal health insurance coverage (Logie et al., 2008). 
Previously, in the immediate post-independence era, Rwanda had 
provided free health care to its citizens, but this was short-lived, as the 
country went into economic decline (Kaberuka, 2000: 1–31). As part of 
the conditions of structural adjustment, in the 1980s user fees for health 
care were introduced, which increased disparities. After the genocide 
the situation worsened (Logie et al., 2008). In 1999, community-based 
health insurance (CBHI) was introduced, in line with the Vision 2020 
goals (Binagwaho et al., 2014).
The term CBHI describes not-for-profit pre-payment plans for 
health care, with community control and voluntary membership 
that provide risk pooling to low-income populations. CBHI has the 
potential to improve access to and quality use of medicines. In Rwanda 
the scheme is called the Mutuelle de Santé (or Mutuelles).
Prior to the launch of the health insurance reforms, government 
health funds were used to directly support public providers, with 
households spending substantial amounts out-of-pocket to see private 
providers or for co-payments to public providers (Saksena et al., 2011). 
Rwanda’s political structure also allowed premium collection from all 
but the poorest people.
Implementation and financing
Mutuelles is a key component of Rwanda’s national health strategy 
on providing universal health care and reaching the health MDGs (Lu 
et al., 2012). Membership is structured into three categories, based on 
the level of economic status: the poor, those of middle income, and the 
privileged. This also determines the amount of premium to be paid. The 
poorest comprise 27 per cent of the total 74 per cent (per population) 
of the total subscribers in Rwanda. A report by the Rwanda Ministry 
of Health (RMoH) in 2016 indicated that the indigent pay a premium 
of RWF 2000 (approximately USD 2.99). Those of middle income 
MISTRA EPIDEMICS TEXT 3 JULY 2019.indd   335 2019/07/03   15:26
This content downloaded from 
            41.215.163.133 on Sun, 14 Jun 2020 20:53:55 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Epidemics and the Health of African Nations
336
comprised about 70 per cent of the subscribers and paid RWF 3,000 
(approximately USD 4.35), and the privileged, representing 3 per cent, 
paid RWF 7,000 (approximately USD 10.34). Payment covers members 
for one Rwandan fiscal year, which is from July to June. Additionally, 
each subscriber pays a co-payment fee of RWF 200 per visit to the 
CBHI unit at the health centre; 10 per cent of this co-payment is 
paid to the hospital by the CBHI (WHO, 2016). Each subscriber is 
restricted to a health centre in their district and visits other specialised 
centres by referral only. The idea of issuing co-payments is to limit the 
abuse of health centres by subscribers (RMoH, 2010).
Despite the growing popularity of taxes as a key source of revenue 
for coverage programmes, Rwanda continued to attempt to collect 
voluntary premiums from informal-sector households, from whom 
taxes can be difficult to access (Saksena et al., 2011).
The major source of revenue to the CBHI from 2012 to 2013 was 
premiums, which accounted for 66 per cent of the contribution to the 
insurance. This was followed by government revenues, at 14 per cent, 
global funds (international aid) at 10 per cent, co-payments, at 6 per 
cent, plus other revenues (like investment returns, for example) of 3 
per cent, and social and private health insurance of 1 per cent (WHO, 
2018). Funds from the government covered referral hospital bills 
and premiums for indigent members (WHO, 2016). The majority of 
premiums came from the middle-income group, who were the largest 
source of revenue. Fifty-five per cent of the premium is retained by 
the health centre to cover claims, while 45 per cent is sent to district 
hospitals to cover hospital claims. Altogether 10 per cent of the latter 
is sent to the national hospitals to cover referral costs. 
Highlighting some of the benefits of CBHI in Rwanda
By 2010 it had been reported that CBHI had a high degree of 
utilisation of health services, which helped to protect members from 
large and unforeseen, potentially catastrophic, health-related expenses 
(Shimeles, 2010). As a result of their insurance functions, CBHI 
schemes protect the income of their members against financial risks 
associated with illness. This happens through two mechanisms: sick 
members of CBHI schemes seek care earlier, resulting in efficiency 
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gains in the consumption of health care services; and sick persons pay 
small out-of-pocket co-payments at the health centres (Diop & Butera, 
2005). In 2005 it had been noted that the CBHI scheme’s coverage also 
increased the use of reproductive health services, including prenatal 
care and delivery care. However, CBHI then had no effect on the use 
of family planning services. 
Greater access of the poor to CBHI scheme benefits was promoted 
through a series of strategies. These included building on partnerships 
between CBHI schemes, and working with existing and newly formed 
grassroots associations under a financing scheme where micro-finance 
schemes provided small loans to the association’s members to pay for 
their yearly contributions to the CBHI schemes. This also opened 
opportunities for the poor CBHI members to have greater access to 
larger micro-finance loans to finance income-generating activities 
(Diop & Butera, 2005; Schneider, 2005; Saksena et al., 2011). 
This community-level social capital has fostered a sense of trust 
among the wider Rwandan community and has boosted the propensity 
of the poor to enrol in the scheme. Additionally, it has stimulated 
networks and business relations with local banks and agricultural co-
operatives to provide access to credit and savings. The implication can 
be drawn that the cooperation among people through the insurance 
has also helped them reach other common goals outside the health 
sector (Diop & Butera, 2005; Schneider, 2005; Saksena et al., 2011). 
The increased mobilisation of domestic resources to ensure CBHI’s 
financial independence also discourages the misappropriation of funds. 
The Rwandan health insurance system remains the most prominent 
and diversified scheme in terms of population coverage. The coverage 
is strongly associated with a reduction in unmet need and of risk of 
catastrophic expenditure (Saksena et al., 2011).
Challenges of CBHI in Rwanda
The major challenge of CBHI is its over-reliance on government 
and donor funds to cover the premiums. Although 66 per cent of the 
scheme’s revenue comes from premiums, the majority of the Rwandan 
population is poor, and this means the government needs to pay more 
than the 14 per cent of the contribution (see Nzeyimana et al., 2014). 
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If government revenue declines, there will be a commensurate decline in 
revenue for the scheme. To guard against this, there is a need therefore to 
develop financing alternatives for the scheme. A recent attempt made by 
the government to move the management of the scheme from the MoH 
to the Rwanda Social Security Board was one such effort to help sustain 
the scheme financially (WHO, 2016). 
In 2010 critics of the programme argued that the CBHI could be 
inefficient and injurious to the health service, which is heavily subsidised 
by funds coming from the treasury as well as international aid. Two 
main reasons came to the fore. First, the flat premium rate (about USD 
2 per year per person) is considered to be too high for the very poor. 
Given a choice the poor will rather defer health care expenditure until 
it is vitally needed. Second, even if extremely poor people become 
members of CBHI, they may not fully utilise its provisions, since not 
everything is free. There are also other layers of expenses to be borne 
such as transport, prescription drugs, and the opportunity cost of time, 
especially for casual labourers. Therefore, the CBHI has the potential 
to further alienate the extremely poor and the uninsured from utilising 
health services (Shimeles, 2010; Saksena et al., 2011). 
The abuse of the CBHI by subscribers is a further challenge. The 
idea of free health care rendered by health centres has increased the rate 
at which patients visit the centres. Though this in itself is good, it has 
been widely reported that they also visit for matters that do not require 
urgent medical attention. In a bid to limit this – the over-utilisation of 
the health centres – the Ministry of Health introduced the co-payment 
method (Carrin et al., 2005). 
This challenge also cuts the other way. The right to essential health 
care was a new concept in Rwanda and at first patients did not always 
know their rights with regard to health care. Generally, they did not 
complain or report the matter when issues were not solved by health 
providers. Also, in several instances, there had been no access to certain 
treatments, and no access to private health providers, but the authorities 
were not made aware. By 2014 things had changed and reports were 
being received that some CBHI members were not satisfied with poor 
courtesy, weak customer care, and the regular stockouts of drugs in some 
contracted health facilities. Incapacity or a delay in the reimbursement 
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of health care bills were also being reported. Other issues included 
incapacity at hospital pharmacies to serve all drug prescriptions due to 
stockouts. 
Such situations affect quality of care for CBHI members. There 
is also the question of over-prescription and over-charging for health 
services; increases in pharmaceutical and medical surgical consumables’ 
prices due to a high inflation rate, among other things, tend to cause 
poor financial management, especially weak cost control (Nyandekwe 
et al., 2014).
P O L I C Y  D I R E C T I O N S  A N D  R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S
The bases upon which these two national health insurance schemes were 
introduced in the two countries differ. In Ghana, the NPP introduced 
their scheme on the basis of winning legitimate power from the 
people. The preceding cash-and-carry system had caused health service 
complications and challenges in the country. Individuals who could not 
afford health care refused to visit hospitals and this had the tendency to 
increase self-help approaches and self-medication. People would only 
go to the hospital in an emergency. The people wanted a better health 
financing system, which the Kufuor-led administration promised in the 
2000 general election campaign. The NHIS in Ghana had come to stay 
through political democratisation in Ghana (Carbone, 2011). 
In Rwanda, it was the evils of the genocide of 1994 which prompted 
the RPF to introduce the universal health insurance which was to 
become the Mutuelle CBHI scheme in 1999. The harsh socio-economic 
and political situation after the genocide had prepared the ground for 
Rwanda’s health insurance scheme (Binagwaho et al., 2014). Although 
Rwanda has 60 per cent of the population living in poverty, with about 
60 per cent of the population having a household income of less than 
USD 52 a month, as defined by the Rwandan government, the sense of 
commitment from the government to provide universal health care for 
the citizenry, rich or poor, serves as a potential model for other African 
countries to emulate.
Second, the mode in which health insurance is organised differs 
between the two countries. Rwanda’s community-based approach 
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allows for a wider chance of sustainability than its Ghanaian counterpart. 
The co-payment of RFW 200 which is made also prevents the abuse of 
health facilities (WHO, 2016). NHIS in Ghana operates currently on a 
national basis where a subscriber is not restricted to a health centre in 
their community. Also the absence of co-payment is likely to increase 
the rate in which NHIS in Ghana can be abused. 
Gros’ suggestion of the political regime of the day influencing 
health policy outcomes is manifested in these two states. Nkrumah had 
pioneered Ghana’s free health care in the 1960s and Kufuor’s NHIS 
followed suit in 2004. In Rwanda, Kagame’s provision of NHIS was a 
military government’s move to provide the democratic good of health 
care (Gros, 2015). The bottom line is that in both countries the political 
regime of the day took major decisions to implement health insurance. 
This shows that the right policies with respect to universal health 
coverage and implementation for the benefit of both urban and rural 
populations can emerge from diverse political regimes.
Third, international initiatives have largely shaped the content of 
subscribers’ packages of national health insurance in both countries. The 
MDGs regarding health care have largely been adopted in these states. 
In Ghana, the free maternal policy was adopted in 2008 to buttress 
the MDG goal of reducing the maternal mortality ratios in African 
countries. The free health care for infants also stems from the wider 
African MDG initiative to reduce child mortality. In Rwanda, the efforts 
to reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and combat diseases 
like malaria and HIV/AIDS have been part of the scheme. This aim is to 
reduce disease prevalence among Rwandans and also to fulfil the MDGs 
in Rwanda. Rwanda is among the developing countries in the world to 
achieve MDGs in health (Abbott & Binagwaho, 2017), and the Mutuelle 
de Santé had a central role in this achievement. It is important to stress 
that with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the mix, Rwanda 
would strive harder to obtain higher optimum goals in the quest to 
ensure goal three of the SDGs, which aims at ensuring healthy lives and 
promotion of wellbeing for all at all ages (see WHO, 2018).
In Ghana, considering that over 86 per cent of the population use 
traditional medicine (Gyasi, 2015: 1), traditional medicine needs to be 
covered by the NHIS. The potency of traditional medicine has raised 
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several arguments among policy-makers in the world. In the Ghanaian 
setting, there have been several government attempts to incorporate 
traditional medicine into orthodox forms of care but the process needs 
to be accelerated. As most Ghanaians access these facilities (Gyasi et 
al., 2017a), it is important that this takes place in order to provide and 
enable a more certified form of holistic care.  Though some question 
the efficacy of traditional medicine, the Ghana Psychic and Traditional 
Healers Association, the Food and Drug Authority (FDA), and 
other allied institutions, including institutions of higher learning (like 
KNUST, which introduced a Department of Herbal Medicine in 2002), 
are there to maintain standards for treatment and prevent quackery 
(Adu-Gyamfi, 2016).
The alternatives offered in traditional medicine could potentially 
help ease the cost burden of drugs that are imported by the government. 
More funds should therefore be made available for further research into 
the range of herbs on which traditional medicine draws. Furthermore, 
the Centre for Plant Medicine Research (CPMR) at Mampong-
Akuapim (CPMR, 2017) has conducted research into herbal plants and 
the production of indigenous medicine to meet the local demands. The 
government needs to do more to facilitate the integration of traditional 
medicine into the existing orthodox care to encourage more Ghanaians 
to utilise and enrol in the NHIS. These same ideals could be emulated 
in those countries in Africa with larger rural settlements which are not 
surveyed and are unreached by biomedical care.
In this context, governments in Africa need to encourage the 
establishment of private herbal hospitals and clinics. In Ghana the 
government has issued a few licences to herbal hospitals like the Amen 
Scientific Herbal Hospital, the Agbeve Herbal Hospital, the Lifeman 
Herbal Clinic, and the Top Herbal Clinic. This notwithstanding, the 
government should extend this encouragement to get more private 
entities to go into herbal medical services – and then follow suit 
with NHIS. Also, because traditional medicine is more accessible, 
collaborative efforts between the traditional healers associations and 
health insurance schemes in Africa would result in wider utilisation. 
More health facilities and clinics need to be built in order to help 
bridge the gap between individuals/communities and health centres. 
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Long distances to hospitals discourage individuals from using the 
still sparse existing facilities. On the larger African platform,  Ghana 
included, government hospitals should give greater attention to systems 
that will allow access to alternatives that will reduce fiscal burdens on the 
provision of health care. In countries like Nigeria, Ghana, and elsewhere 
in Africa, the increasing population and the increase in communicable 
and non-communicable diseases that are not fully covered under 
existing insurance packages should draw the attention of policy-makers 
to what is doable: preventive health care strategies, enforcement of 
public legislation, and research into traditional and alternative health 
medicines which could remain cheap, accessible, and efficacious to larger 
populations and reduce the financial burden on individuals and the state.
Concerning the Rwandan case study, although international donor 
funds subsidise the cost of covering more indigents, the Rwanda 
Ministry of Health might reconsider its decision on the co-payment 
method as this is an obstacle to greater inclusivity. To prevent the possible 
reliance on other means of medical care, it might also engage traditional 
healers to provide efficient health care alongside the orthodox care in 
order to subsidise cost. The larger debate to use traditional medicines 
in countries is further enforced by the question of affordability and 
sustainability of health insurance in growing populations. New and 
emerging technologies that are enhancing or accelerating the science of 
herbal and alternative medicines should also be part of the debate.
The African question continues to beg for policies that are home 
grown rather than those that have been bequeathed to the continent by 
institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. With all good intents and 
purposes, the question of effective management of health care, including 
the question of health financing, seemed to have been largely left in 
the hands of political patrons. The issue of financial accountability by 
office holders and those who manage health care should not remain in 
the general mix. African countries that hope to develop their economies 
must appreciate that mismanaging health care operates in tandem with 
economic mismanagement. The former can grievously hurt the health 
of labour in African countries, especially of those who are largely in the 
informal sector; it will also affect those employed in the public sector, 
and those in the private sector whose insurance is not fully guaranteed 
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under poor-paying jobs and harsh working conditions, such as in the 
mines and in the fields. Improved health status dovetails with increased 
productivity, educational performance, and life expectancy, as well as a 
propensity for a decrease in debt and expenditure on healthcare. Quality 
health care should be seen as an inalienable right of all human beings, 
and Africans in particular. 
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